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LESSONS FOR PATENT POLICY FROM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON 
PATENT LITIGATION 
by                                                                                                                        
James Bessen*                                                                                                     
Michael J. Meurer** 
This Article reviews empirical patent litigation research to reveal patent 
policy lessons.  First, the Article presents facts about patent litigation.  
Next, it analyzes the patent premium.  Patent litigation research reveals 
little about the magnitude of the patent premium, but the research reveals 
the strategies firms use to capture the patent premium and the patent 
policy instruments that determine the patent premium.  Next, the Article 
evaluates the patent prosecution process and notes that making efforts to 
refine a patent application can affect the value of the patent.  The Article 
then identifies reforms for improving PTO performance.  Finally, the 
Article discusses policy changes that patent litigation research suggests 
would improve procedural fairness and reduce patent litigation costs. 
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We explore lessons for patent policy that can be learned from empirical 
research on patent litigation. After presenting some salient facts about patent 
litigation, we turn first to analysis of the patent premium, the increment in 
profit from invention that flows from the rights conferred by a patent grant. 
Patent litigation research does not tell us much about the size of the premium, 
but it does shed light on what strategies firms use to capture the premium and 
what patent policy instruments determine the premium. Next, patent litigation 
research helps us evaluate the patent prosecution process. Specifically, we 
comment on the power of applicants to affect the value of a patent through their 
efforts to refine their applications. We also comment on reforms that might 
improve the performance of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Finally, 
we discuss some policy changes that patent litigation research suggests might 
improve procedural fairness and reduce the expected cost of patent litigation. 
 
II. FACTS ABOUT PATENT LITIGATION 
Patent litigation has been called the sport of kings; it is complex, 
uncertain, and expensive.1 There is a significant risk that a patent will be 
invalidated at trial,2 but that danger appears to be declining over time.3 There 
also appears to be significant uncertainty about the scope of patent claims and 
whether a particular defendant is infringing.4 For patent suits with less than $1 
million at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $290,000 and the 
median estimated total litigation cost is $500,000; for suits with $1–$25 million 
at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $1 million and the median 
estimated total litigation cost is $2 million; for suits with more than $25 million 
at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $2.5 million and the median 
estimated total litigation cost is $3.995 million.5 
In 2000, the United States PTO granted about 180,000 patents. The same 
year about 2,000 patent suits were filed involving about 3,000 patents.6 About 
1 Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/04/wo_kline042804.asp. 
2 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (54% of patents were found valid in a population of 
300 final validity decisions). 
3 See id. at 206. 
4 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases? 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Patent Cases] (“[D]istrict 
court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.”). 
5 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, at 
22 (2003). 
6 KIMBERLY A. MOORE, WORTHLESS PATENTS 1–2 (George Mason Law & Econ. 
Working Paper Series, No. 04-29, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=566941. 
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4% of the patent suits that terminated in fiscal year 2000 reached trial.7 The 
number of patent suits filed doubled over the decade of the 1990s, but the 
number of cases terminating during or after trial has remained roughly 
constant.8 Thus, the fraction of suits ending in trial declined. Nevertheless, the 
fraction of patent cases that go to trial is still relatively high compared to civil 
cases in general; only 1.9% of the federal civil cases terminated in the fiscal 
year 2000 went to trial.9 The trend in filing of patent suits is similar to the trend 
in trademark suits. In contrast, filing of copyright suits has been relatively flat, 
and filing of antitrust and contract suits declined over the 1990s.10 
Patent holders win slightly more than half of their cases.11 The 58% win 
rate reported by Kimberly Moore in patent cases is less than the 64% win rate 
achieved by corporate plaintiffs facing corporate defendants in contract cases.12 
Interestingly, the win rate is sensitive to the presence of a jury. Juries are more 
likely than judges to uphold patent validity,13 and patent owners are more likely 
to win a suit tried to a jury than a suit tried to a judge. Outcomes are close to 
fifty-fifty in patent cases tried before a judge.14 
 These data possibly reflect a growing burden from patent litigation: the 
trial rate is double the average of federal civil litigation, patent trials are 
especially expensive, and filings are increasing rapidly. Simple trial rates, 
outcome measures, and trends in filing are not terribly informative, however, 
about the normative impact of patent litigation. Thus, researchers engage in 
more sophisticated analysis of patent litigation data. The following sections 
review some of that analysis and connect it to patent policy issues. 
Before we begin that review, we need to explain why simple litigation 
statistics are hard to interpret and hard to link to policy analysis. The main 
7 The estimate is based on cases reported to the Federal Judicial Center. We accessed 
the data through the web site created by Cornell law professors Theodore Eisenberg and 
Kevin M. Clermont.  Of the 2221 patent cases that terminated in the 1999 fiscal year, 85 
terminated during or after trial.  THEODORE EISENBERG AND KEVIN M. CLERMONT, JUDICIAL 
STATISTICAL INQUIRY FORM, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm; see also 
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 383 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (noting that 6.9% of 
patent suits go to trial). 
8 EISENBERG AND CLERMONT, supra note 7, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/ 
questata.htm. 
9 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
119, 136 (2002). 
10 EISENBERG AND CLERMONT, supra note 7, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/ 
questata.htm; see also Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or 
May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 577, 590 (analyzing 
the decline in contract litigation over the 1990s). 
11 See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 385 (the patentee won 58% of the cases). But 
see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are 
Small Firms Handicapped? 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 59 (2004) (win rates are close to 50% in 
patent cases). 
12 See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case 
Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S103 (1997). 
13 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 213. 
14 Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368. 
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problem is that patent suits probably constitute a small and uncharacteristic 
subset, drawn from the set of all patent disputes. Certainly, patent trials 
constitute a small and uncharacteristic subset of filed patent suits. A selection 
bias distorts inferences based on statistics like patent holder win rates at trial. 
Similarly, a selection bias may distort inferences based on studies of patent 
lawsuit filing.15 
Proper interpretation of litigation statistics requires understanding why 
patent disputes arise, why suits are filed, and why certain suits reach trial. To 
illustrate, let us study the claim that the Federal Circuit is pro-patentee. Assume 
the Federal Circuit has changed patent law in such a way that the set of patent 
disputes has not changed and the probability of patentee victory at trial has 
increased. If these assumptions were true, what would they imply for the 
frequency of litigation and success of patent owners at trial? A naïve approach 
would treat litigation as random and independent of patent and party 
characteristics. Then the assumed actions of the Federal Circuit would not 
change the frequency of litigation, but would increase the observed success rate 
of patent holders. 
By contrast, economists treat litigation as a bargaining failure and use 
bargaining models to explain why certain disputes are “selected” for litigation. 
Several models can be used for this purpose; most of our discussion focuses on 
the simplest plausible model. According to the settlement cost model, firms 
choose trial over settlement because the cost of settlement exceeds the cost of 
trial.16 For most types of disputes, the settlement cost model is implausible 
because trial costs typically far exceed settlement costs. In fact, this is probably 
true of most patent disputes. But patent disputes can plausibly reverse the 
inequality. Settlement costs may exceed trial costs because a valid patent 
creates rights that occasionally translate into significant market power and 
profit that cannot be duplicated through a settlement contract; in these cases 
rational parties go to trial. 
Consider an example of litigation concerning a patent on a chemical.17 The 
chemical invention opens a new market, supplied by the patentee and a single 
competitor. Suppose the competitor arguably infringes the patent and the 
parties agree that the patentee has a probability p of winning at trial. Suppose 
profit in the new market is $200 million if the patentee is a monopolist; 
15 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 141 (discussing the refraction effect); Joel 
Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of 
Litigation, 41 J.L. ECON. 451, 458 (1998). 
16 This model appears in Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 
RAND J. ECON. 77 (1989). The same article presents a private information model of a patent 
settlement. The most common approach is the optimism model of patent settlement, which is 
discussed for example in JEAN O. LANJOUW & JOSH LERNER, THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6296. 
This survey article focuses more on the economic literature and covers significant results not 
discussed in this Article. 
17 We think this model might be particularly appropriate when applied to 
pharmaceuticals. 
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alternatively, the total profit in the industry is $150 million if the competitor 
competes against the patentee under a patent license, and total profit in the 
industry is $80 million if the competitor competes against the patentee without 
a license. Suppose that the cost of trial is $4 million to each party. If the parties 
go to trial and the patentee wins, then each party pays their legal fees and the 
patentee enjoys a $200 million monopoly. If the parties go to trial and the 
competitor wins, then each party pays their legal fees and they each get $40 
million in profit, which is half of the industry profit of $80 million (we assume 
neither firm has an advantage and so competition leads them to split the 
industry profit equally). The parties can avoid legal fees by agreeing to a 
settlement license and dividing the industry profit of $150 million in a mutually 
acceptable fashion. 
Settlement costs arise implicitly in this example and lead to equilibrium 
trial under certain conditions. Settlement is attractive to the parties in this 
example because it avoids trial costs.18 But settlement is costly because it 
sacrifices some of the monopoly profit available in the new product market (we 
assume industry profit is $150 million rather than $200 million following 
settlement). In other words, we assume the contract terms that regulate 
competition in the duopoly market created by the settlement license do not fully 
replicate the monopoly outcome. This assumption can be justified by assuming 
antitrust law constrains the terms in the license or by assuming contracting 
costs (usually attributed to informational problems) impede perfect 
cartelization. 
The outcome in this model depends on the probable outcome of trial. The 
critical value of the probability of patentee success, p, in this model is 65%—at 
that probability, the joint profit from settlement just equals the joint profit from 
trial. The joint profit from settlement is constant at $150 million, and the joint 
profit from trial is $200(.65) + $80(.35) – $4(2) = $150 million. If the 
probability of patentee success is less than 65%, then parties will settle. The 
division of industry profit achieved through the settlement license depends on 
the strength of the patentee’s case.19 If p is greater than 90%, then the 
competitor will be deterred from entering the market. The $4 million cost of a 
trial exceeds the expected profit from trial, $40(1 – p). Finally, when the 
probability of patentee success is between 65% and 90%, then trial occurs.20 
This quick modeling exercise gets us to the point where we can discuss the 
selection effect. Assume this model explains why patent suits go to trial, and 
assume the effect of Federal Circuit decisions is to increase the probability that 
18 Settlement is also attractive because it avoids a trial outcome that invalidates or 
narrows the patent, which renders it ineffective as an entry barrier. Another possible 
settlement agreement calls for the patentee to withdraw from the market and assign the 
patent or exclusively license the patent to the competitor. Like the duopoly license, this 
strategy may suffer from high settlement costs especially because of antitrust scrutiny.  
19 If the parties split the bargaining surplus equally, then the patentee gets a share of the 
industry profit equal to 75 + 100p, and the competitor gets 75 – 100p. In particular, the 
parties share the industry profit equally if the patentee has no chance of winning at trial. 
20 The expected profit to the patentee from litigation is 200p + 40(1 – p) – 4 = 36 + 
160p. Notice the profit from trial equals the profit from settling at p = .65. 
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a patentee wins a patent suit. What would that imply for observed win rates at 
trial? The answer is not clear, but one possibility is that the observed win rate is 
unchanged but the frequency of trial goes up. Notice this is quite different from 
the naïve view that trial frequency would not change and the win rate would 
rise. The win rate might be unchanged, because only disputes in which the 
plaintiff’s probability of victory falls within the 65% to 90% range go to trial. 
The assumed actions of the Federal Circuit do nothing to change that range. 
The Federal Circuit’s actions move some disputes out of that range and other 
disputes into that range, and the net effect is unclear.21 
The essential message to draw from the foregoing discussion is that 
interpretation of trial outcome data requires a model of litigation. It is quite 
possible for the Federal Circuit to favor patentees without seeing win rates 
change. Alternatively, it is quite possible that win rates could change without 
the Federal Circuit or the PTO altering patent standards. The region of trial 
outcomes in the settlement cost model are determined by factors like the rigor 
of antitrust policy, the cost of trial, and the market value of inventions. 
III. THE PATENT PREMIUM 
A. The Magnitude of the Patent Premium 
Economic theory and evidence present a strong case for subsidization of 
R&D in some industries. R&D generates positive externalities and therefore, it 
is underprovided by competitive markets. The patent system is one of the main 
policy tools used to subsidize R&D.22 Various types of empirical research 
provide evidence on the magnitude of the patent premium—the reward 
inventors get from patenting their inventions. The research shows that patents 
provide a significant effective subsidy of R&D, but one that is probably much 
smaller than most patent lawyers would expect. Managers, on the other hand, 
would not be surprised. Surveys of R&D managers reveal that firms have other, 
often stronger, R&D incentives stemming from lead time advantage, learning, 
complementary products, and secrecy.23 
21 The following example would result in no change in the win rate and an increase in 
the frequency of trial. Suppose that there are “good” patents with p = .7 and “bad” patent 
with p = .3. If the Federal Circuit increases the share of good patents by 20%, then trial 
frequency would increase by 20% and the win rate would be 70% before and after the 
change. 
22 Government funding of universities and research labs, research grants, R&D 
contracts, and tax subsidies are the other main tools. 
23 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 784–85; WESLEY M. 
COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND 
WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper 7552, 2000); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable 
Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257–69 (2004). 
2005] LESSONS FOR PATENT POLICY 7 
 
 
Following Schankerman,24 the ratio of the value of the patent stock to the 
value of the R&D stock provides an upper bound estimate of the “equivalent 
subsidy rate” for patent protection—that is, the subsidy that would be required 
to induce firms to make the same expenditures on R&D if there were no patent 
protection.25 This ratio is thus a measure of the incentive effect of patents after 
taking other incentives into account. Several different types of studies provide 
estimates of this ratio. Studies based on renewal rates of patents in European 
countries find upper bound estimates of equivalent subsidy rates around 15%, 
although with quite a large range of variation over industries.26 Survey data 
provide estimates ranging from 11–17%, again with significant variation across 
industries.27 
Perhaps the most direct measures can be inferred from estimates of the 
effect of patent stocks on the market value of firms.28 Since Griliches, 
economists have run regressions to decompose the market value of firms into 
separate contributions from physical capital, the stock of past R&D 
expenditures, and the stock of accumulated patents.29 In general, these studies 
usually find a small, but positive, contribution of patents to the value of the 
firm above and beyond the contribution from R&D. 
The most recent study in this line augments patent counts with citation 
data and gets better estimates of the market value of U.S. manufacturing 
firms.30 Interpreting their data at the sample mean, we find an upper bound 
estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate of 12%; estimated at the sample median 
this figure is 7%.31 Thus, consistent with the survey literature, patents generally 
create a premium sufficient to cover a relatively small fraction of the cost of 
R&D. 
24 Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology 
Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 95 (1998). 
25 This is an upper bound estimate to the extent that there are diminishing returns to 
R&D and already existing subsidies for R&D. Also, to the extent that some of a firm’s 
patented inventions do not derive from R&D on its products and processes, the value of 
patents overstates the subsidy. 
26 See Schankerman, supra note 24; Jean O. Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and 
Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 405 (1998). 
27 Estimates based on survey data of imitation costs suggest a figure of 11%; using a 
novel data set that combines survey and quantitative data for U.S. firms renders a mean 
estimate of 17%. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., R&D AND THE PATENT PREMIUM 29–30 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2004), http://papers.nber.org/papers/ 
w9431. 
28 Estimates based on market value regressions have the advantage that they reflect 
possible strategic interaction between firms. Estimates based on patent renewals assume that 
the value of each patent is independent of other patents in the portfolio; this assumption may 
be violated when firms pursue strategic uses of patent portfolios. 
29 See Bronwyn H. Hall, Innovation and Market Value, in PRODUCTIVITY, INNOVATION 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 177 (Ray Barrell et al. eds., 2000) for a review of this 
literature. 
30 See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2005), http://www.iue.it/Personal/bhall/ HallJaffeTrajtenberg_RJEjan04.pdf . 
31 Details of these calculations are available on request from the authors. 
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The evidence on the patent premium presents a puzzle when contrasted 
with popular accounts suggesting high and growing profits from patents.32 The 
puzzle dissolves when we probe deeper into the nature of the patent premium. 
First, it is important to recognize that, in absolute terms, the patent premium is 
large; 12% of the 2002 non-Federally funded manufacturing sector R&D 
expenditures amounts to about $12 billion.33 After taking account of the costs 
of acquiring these patents, this is roughly equivalent to the value of federally 
funded R&D performed by manufacturing firms ($10.7 billion). Second, the 
value of patents varies sharply across inventions. In particular: 
1. Patent values are highly skewed. Hall et al. find that a small number of 
highly cited patents are responsible for a large share of the total value of 
patents. Scherer and Harhoff review a variety of evidence on returns and 
find that often the top 10% of patents (or innovations) account for 80-
90% of the total returns.34 
2. The patent premium varies across industries. There is no consensus on 
precise magnitudes, but most commentators believe the premium is large 
in biotech and the pharmaceutical industry.35 
3. Entrants earn a higher premium than incumbents. In a subsequent 
study by Hall, using the same dataset, she found that in electronics, 
machinery, instruments, and semiconductors the positive value of patent 
stocks was largely limited to entrant firms, especially after 1984. In 
aggregate, incumbent firms in those industries tended to have either no 
significant value to their patent stocks or even a negative value.36 
B. How Do Firms Use Patents to Capture the Patent Premium? 
In the previous section, we did not cite any empirical research on patent 
litigation in relation to the magnitude of the patent premium. Litigation 
research is not well-suited to estimating that magnitude. Certainly, the expected 
cost of litigation sets a lower bound on the expected value of litigated patents, 
but that is not very helpful, because estimates of expected litigation costs are 
hard to obtain, and it is not clear how close actual patent values are to the lower 
bound. 
32 See generally Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in 
Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 54. 
33 Total manufacturing R&D spending in 2002 was $109 billion, of which $10.7 billion 
was federally funded. 
34  See Hall et al., supra note 30; F.M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy 
for a World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL’Y 559 (2000); see also MOORE, 
supra note 6, at 14, http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=566941 (53.7% of 
U.S. patents expire for failure to pay maintenance fees). 
35  See Levin et al., supra note 23; ARORA ET AL., supra note 27.  Schankerman finds a 
rather different pattern across French industries.  Part of this he attributes to price controls 
for pharmaceuticals; part may also be due to strategic effects.  Schankerman, supra note 24, 
at 77–107. 
 36 BRONWYN H. HALL, EXPLORING THE PATENT EXPLOSION sec. 3.3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10605, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10605. 
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In contrast, litigation research provides a valuable complement to other 
types of research on the question of how firms capture the patent premium. For 
example, evidence that firms in a particular industry have a high propensity to 
litigate their patents might indicate that patents are particularly valuable in that 
industry. Furthermore, litigation research reveals characteristics of patents and 
patent holders that are especially likely to be involved in litigation. When 
combined with survey, stock market, and patent renewal studies, these findings 
paint a picture of the type of firm and type of invention that benefits most from 
patent protection. Survey, stock market, and renewal studies have the 
advantage of using data on all patentees, but they cannot provide information 
about the identities of licensees or opposing parties in litigation. Naturally, 
studies of litigation and licensing provide such information. These studies can 
provide information about the characteristics of accused infringers and 
licensees and the magnitudes of damage payments or license fees. Additionally, 
litigation studies can provide information on the duration of a dispute, whether 
infringement was judged to be willful, whether the defendant pursued an 
independent research program, and whether attorney’s fees were shifted in 
either direction. 
1. Exclusion and Licensing of Competitors 
Unlike many patent law commentators, we believe that the patent premium 
ultimately derives entirely from the rights of exclusion created by the patent 
grant. In other words, the patent premium flows from patent litigation or, more 
typically, the threat of litigation.37 Thus, studies of patent litigation potentially 
can reveal information about the nature of the patent premium. For example, 
studies of litigation help discriminate how much of the patent premium flows 
from three possible sources. The first source of profit from patents arises when 
a patentee excludes competitors from practicing the patented invention or 
forces competitors to take a license under threat of an infringement suit.38 
Exclusion is a common practice in the pharmaceutical industry; and licensing 
competitors is a common practice in the semi-conductor industry. A second 
source arises when a patentee licenses or assigns the patent to a firm or firms 
37 We are skeptical of the empirical significance of patent signaling, the use of patents 
to monitor research employees, and certain types of defensive patenting. Patent applications 
are too costly compared to other signals or other monitoring techniques for the patent 
signaling story or the employee monitoring story to justify patenting. These stories each have 
merit as derivative sources of patent value. Once a firm decides for some other reason to 
patent, then its patent stock could signal information to financial markets, and managers 
might decide to use patents as a measure of employee productivity. Commentators use the 
term defensive patenting in different ways. According to one version, inventors patent an 
invention to prevent a stranger from later inventing and patenting the same invention and 
suing the first inventor. We think it must be cheaper to make some other form of disclosure 
that would defeat subsequent patent claims. Thus, this type of defensive patenting cannot be 
the primary motivation for patenting. 
38 Commentators sometimes describe blocked patents as defensive when the underlying 
technology is subject to another firm’s patent. In Part III.B.3, we discuss strategic use of 
patents by defendants in patent lawsuits. Readers should recognize that an improvement 
patent or a new use patent can be used to exclude or license competitors and this source of 
profit is distinct from the strategic use of patents to settle litigation. 
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outside of the patentee’s industry. This is the main source of patent profit for 
universities and independent inventors.39 A third source of profit arises from a 
variety of strategic uses of patents in litigation. Certain strategic uses, such as 
the use of patents to avoid litigation and facilitate cross-licensing, may be 
socially valuable.40 Other strategic uses, including opportunistic and 
anticompetitive patent suits based on weak or invalid patents, are clearly 
socially harmful. 
Survey and stock market research indicates that the patent premium is 
greatest in the pharmaceutical industry. These findings match the intuition of 
most commentators, who suppose that patents are critical to pharmaceutical 
companies that use them to exclude potential competitors.41 For example, 
Glynn Lunney Jr. uses event study methodology to examine the reactions of 
firm stock prices to court decisions in patent cases. He found pharmaceutical 
companies experienced sharp drops in market value after key patents were held 
noninfringed or invalid. In one case, Eli Lilly lost nearly 30% of its stock 
market value. The evidence of such reactions for firms in other industries was 
much weaker, highlighting the importance of exclusion for pharmaceutical 
patents. 
Contrary evidence comes from renewal and litigation studies, which 
suggest that pharmaceutical patents only have average value. Renewal data 
shows that pharmaceutical patents rank near the mean in terms of frequency of 
renewal;42 similarly, data on lawsuit filing shows pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology patents rank near the mean in terms of frequency of filing per 
patent.43 We think the conventional wisdom has it right and offer two 
explanations for this discrepancy. First, uncertain and skewed patent value is 
especially apparent in the pharmaceutical industry. Firms get patents at an early 
stage of commercialization, get no value out of most patents, and get a bonanza 
from a few. Renewal rates are not especially high as failed drug candidates get 
weeded out. Second, litigation rates measured by Allison et al., which do not 
39 Commentators note that patents are assets that help start-ups get funding. We agree 
but note that this is not an independent source of patent value. Financiers value patents 
because of the exclusionary rights they provide. 
40 It is possible, however, that the dynamic effect of cross-licensing may reduce R&D 
incentives. 
41 For example, Allison, Lemley, Moore, and Trunkey are surprised by their finding 
that pharmaceutical patents are not litigated more than average patents: “This result seems 
quite surprising, given the large amounts of money at stake in pharmaceutical patent suits, 
the extensive research and development costs that go into inventions, the comprehensive 
lobbying efforts by pharmaceutical manufacturers for technology-specific patent laws, recent 
evidence that pharmaceutical companies have violated the antitrust laws in an effort to 
extend their patent rights, and prior survey finding pharmaceutical companies consider 
patents more important than companies in any other industry.” John R. Allison et al., 
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 474–75 (2004). Mark Lemley suggested to us that their 
result may have been skewed because they do not capture end of term suits. 
42 Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation 
Estimations of Patent Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 678 (1998) (finding payment of 
renewal fees correlates with litigation in Germany). 
43 Allison et al., supra note 41, at 474–75; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11. 
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show high rates in pharmaceuticals, are measuring litigation per patent. In 
contrast, our research shows that the chemical industry, SIC code 28, which 
includes pharmaceuticals, has the highest rate of litigation per firm of any 
industry.44 Our interpretation is that the pharmaceutical industry has a relatively 
large number of “dry holes,” but it vigorously protects commercially successful 
products through patent litigation. 
The semiconductor industry is an interesting contrast to pharmaceuticals, 
because surveys of R&D managers do not highly rank patents as a means of 
appropriating profit from semi-conductor inventions.45 Nevertheless, the 
industry does get a lot of patents, it tends to renew them, and it sees a lot of 
patent licensing and litigation.46 The surveys and econometric analysis of 
litigation data by Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis suggests that there are two different 
types of semiconductor firms that pursue two different strategies for exploiting 
their patents. Large, vertically integrated firms tend to cross-license their 
patents, while smaller design firms, by necessity, license a manufacturer to 
make their chips, but they are litigious and exclusionary toward other industry 
members.47 
An important goal for future research is to identify more clearly why 
patents in the semiconductor industry apparently do not contribute as much to 
industry profit as patents in the pharmaceutical industry. Current research hints 
that firms can pursue an exclusionary strategy more easily in industries like 
pharmaceuticals in which a single firm holds a key patent or a few patents that 
cover a product. Patents are harder to exploit in industries like semiconductors, 
in which many parties hold patents that cover their own and their competitors’ 
products.48 Future litigation and licensing research should also provide a better 
sense of the frequency with which patents are asserted against industry 
competitors as opposed to firms outside of the industry of the patentee. 
44 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript at 12, on file with authors). 
45 Levin et al., supra note 23, at 784; COHEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 6. 
46 Scholars disagree whether litigation rates are high in the semiconductor industry. We 
discuss strategic use of patents in the industry and explain infra at text accompanying note 
75 why we think the industry has a high rate of litigation. 
47 Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology 
and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804, 817–818 (2004). 
Ziedonis’s data show that litigation is increasing for the vertically integrated firms, and 
Bessen & Meurer show that the industry as whole has a high rate of litigation per firm. See 
infra text accompanying notes 72–75 for more discussion of patent litigation in the 
semiconductor industry. 
48 Levin et al., supra note 23, at 798, and several subsequent authors (especially COHEN 
ET AL., supra note 23, at 19–23) make a distinction between “discrete” and “complex” 
technologies. The former have patents that correspond uniquely (or almost so) with products 
and the patents have well-defined boundaries. Below we discuss the strategic use of patents 
in the semi-conductor industry to deter litigation. Perhaps semi-conductor firms have a high 
propensity to acquire and renew patents for defensive reasons, so “dry holes” don’t really 
matter if the patents still pose a potential threat to competitors. 
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2. Assignment and Licensing of Non-Competitors 
Strategies used to exploit patents depend on the nature of the patent-
holding entity. Large firms engage in what William Baumol calls “routine 
innovation,” a term borrowed from Schumpeter.49 They have relatively 
systematic R&D programs that generate inventions and patents directed toward 
the industries that the firm participates in. If Baumol is correct, then large firms 
normally use their patents to exclude or license their competitors.50 Universities 
exploit their patents in quite a different fashion. We suspect and hope that few 
or none of their patents relate to the education industry; thus universities gain 
most of their profit by licensing and assigning their patents to non-
competitors.51 By definition, two other classes of patent holders exploit their 
patents by assignment or licensing of non-competitors: independent inventors 
and licensing shops. The story with small firms is mixed. We suspect many 
small firms use their patents against competitors to facilitate entry and survival 
in their industry. We suspect many other small firms participate in the market 
for R&D and license their patents downstream to firms in related industries.52 
Assignment and licensing of non-competitors was more significant in the 
early American patent system than it is today. Khan and Sokoloff document a 
flourishing market for patent rights and a robust class of independent inventors 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The role of the independent 
inventor is diminished in the modern economy, in which 71% of patents issue 
to large firms.53 We conjecture that the majority of patents held by large firms 
and a significant fraction of patents held by small firms are used within the 
industries that the firms occupy. If true, then exclusion and licensing of 
competitors is the dominant source of patent value. Patent litigation research 
can shed light on our conjecture by measuring the fraction of defendants that 
are in the same industry as the patentee-plaintiff firm.54 
Despite its lower frequency, assignment and licensing of non-competitors 
holds great policy interest. Academic and independent inventions possibly have 
disproportionately greater social value, and thus merit special attention.55 
49 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 21, 55 (2002). 
50 No doubt big firms sometimes hold patents relevant to other industries because of the 
unpredictable nature of R&D, the coarse linkage between technology and industry, and 
shifting product interests of the firms. 
51 Universities sometimes participate in faculty based start-ups, and the start-ups may 
use patents to exclude or license competitors. Thus, universities indirectly get some profit 
from the traditional strategies of excluding or licensing competitors. 
52 To recap, we have three categories: independent inventors who do not commercialize 
their inventions; small firms that commercialize their patented inventions and use their 
patents to exclude or license competitors; and small firms that sell technology (for example, 
bio-tech research tools) to downstream firms (pharmaceutical companies). 
53 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000). 
54 A selection problem must be addressed when interpreting data describing the 
industry proximity of plaintiffs and defendants. Perhaps a firm is more likely to file suit 
against a non-competing defendant. Repeated interaction is less likely with a non-
competitor, and the threat of patent retaliation might be lower. 
55 Allison et al., supra note 41, at 469–70. 
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Further, independent inventors and small firms are probably more dependent on 
the patent premium than other patent holders. Large firms have a wider variety 
of methods for extracting value from their inventions and non-profits get 
substantial government funding.56 Finally, there is concern that independent 
inventors and licensing shops are especially likely to abuse the patent system 
by seeking licenses for weak or invalid patents. 
Although independent inventors and non-profit inventors capture the 
patent premium the same way, they pursue fairly different types of inventions 
and patenting and litigation practices. Allison and Lemley find that small 
entities tend to patent mostly mechanical inventions and medical instruments.57 
Universities, on the other hand, are active across more fields of technology 
including biotechnology, electronics, and software, although evidence suggests 
that, in fields other than biotechnology, most transfer of technology to the 
private sector occurs without patents.58 These numbers may reflect the high 
fixed cost of conducting R&D in many fields of technology, which forecloses 
participation by independent inventors.59 
Following the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, universities have become actively 
involved in patenting and licensing their patents. Like other patents, the value 
of university patents is highly skewed; only 0.56% of the licenses earned more 
than $1 million.60 Overall, universities received more than $1 billion in 
licensing royalties and cashed-in equity shares in 2000,61 but this accounted for 
only “about 4.7% of their research expenditure.”62 
Independent inventors and nonprofit patent holders choose vastly different 
litigation strategies. Allison et al. find that small firms and independent 
inventors file patent lawsuits about three times as often on a per patent basis as 
other patent holders,63 while non-profit patent holders litigate at about the mean 
rate for all entities.64 Possibly, small firms and independent inventors litigate 
more because their patents are more valuable.65 They could be more valuable 
because they cover inventions with higher average quality or because patents 
are a more important source of profit to small firms and independent inventors. 
Allison et al. cast doubt on the first possibility. They use the number of 
56 See Barnett, supra note 23, at 1283. 
57 Allison & Lemley, supra note 53, at 2102. 
58 See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring 
Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44 (2002). Furthermore, most university 
patent licenses are for early stage ideas that are little more than “proof of concept.” Only 
12% were “ready for practical use.” Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University 
Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003). 
59 But this does not explain independent inventors’ low rate of patenting software, a 
field with many small entities. This may also reflect the greater costs that an independent 
inventor or small entity faces in prosecuting and enforcing patents. 
60 Thursby & Thursby, supra note 58, at 1052. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Allison et al., supra note 41, at 466. 
64 Id. at 466 n.134. 
65 Id. at 471. 
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citations a patent receives from later patents as an indicator of invention 
quality. They find that litigated patents on average receive significantly more 
citations than non-litigated patents, except in the case of patents held by 
independent inventors and small firms.66 The second possibility finds support 
from Hall, who obtains evidence that the patent premium is larger for small 
firms.67 A third explanation is that large firms resolve disputes more easily 
because of reputational or scale advantages.68 Finally, small firms and 
independent inventors might engage in more opportunistic litigation. We 
comment on this possibility in the next section. 
3. Strategic Litigation 
Growing evidence suggests that part of the private value created by patents 
arises from strategic patent litigation. We use this label to cover three different 
patent litigation strategies that depart from the traditional notions of how firms 
use patents to create value. First, firms use patents to ward off patent suits by 
their competitors. Second, dominant firms threaten or file predatory patent suits 
against smaller actual or potential competitors. Third, firms threaten or file 
opportunistic patent suits to earn nuisance settlement payments. 
Some researchers contend that firms have the power to reduce the 
expected cost of patent litigation by building “defensive” patent portfolios.69 
This view is supported by survey evidence that many firms do acquire patents 
for purposes of trading.70 This theory is typically presented as a variant of the 
arms control theory of mutually assured destruction—if you sue me, I will sue 
you, and we will enjoin each other. The theory is plausible in industries that 
rely on complex technologies that combine many patented components or 
features. Other theories can explain why defensive portfolios reduce expected 
litigation costs. First, a potential plaintiff would be leery of suing a defendant 
with a large patent portfolio because it would have to investigate the portfolio 
to estimate the risk of a successful counterclaim. Even if the defendant could 
not raise a successful counterclaim, it succeeds in imposing higher litigation 
costs on potential plaintiffs. Second, aggressive offensive use of a large 
portfolio supports a reputation for being a tough litigator, which can discourage 
potential plaintiffs. Third, large portfolios may deter entry and thereby reduce 
66 Allison et al. find that forward citations are the strongest predictor of litigation 
except for patents assigned to individuals and small entities. Id. at 455. 
67 HALL, supra note 36, sec. 2.3. During the 1980–84 period, there was no premium on 
patents in the valuation of new firms compared to incumbents, but in the 1985–89 period 
there was a significant premium to patents held by entrants in complex product industries.  
Id., sec. 3.1. 
68 Alternatively, perhaps large firms have more reason than small firms to fear 
retaliation in the form of a patent infringement counterclaim; independent inventors have no 
such fear.  Allison et al., supra note 41, at 469. 
69 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 47 (“[T]his portfolio effect is stronger 
for smaller companies, as measured by employment.”). 
70 COHEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 17; see Rivette & Kline, supra note 32, at 62 
(describing a small chip design company that averted a patent infringement lawsuit by Intel 
by purchasing a patent from a bankrupt firm that potentially covered Intel chips).   
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the number of potential plaintiffs.71 Fourth, a potential plaintiff with a large 
portfolio might join with a defendant with a large portfolio to form a pool to 
offer licenses to third parties, thereby gaining from reduced negotiation and 
enforcement costs. 
The hypothesis that defensive portfolios reduce expected litigation cost is 
supported by evidence that rates of litigation per patent decline as portfolio size 
grows. It is also supported by evidence that rates of litigation per patent are low 
in industries known for active cross-licensing of portfolios of patents covering 
entire technology fields, such as electronics and semiconductors.72 For instance, 
Allison et al. argue that “[t]he paucity of litigation in the semiconductor 
industry is consistent with sector-specific studies of that industry by Hall and 
Ziedonis and others and makes perfect sense given the pattern of ‘mutually 
assured destruction’ that prevails among established companies in the 
industry.”73 Presumably, the pattern of mutually assured destruction leads firms 
to settle early in patent litigation to avoid the risk that they will both suffer 
adverse infringement or validity judgments. 
But new evidence points in the opposite direction. First, the ratio of 
litigation per patent can be a misleading measure of the litigation hazard facing 
the firm. For example, semiconductor firms both acquire a large number of 
patents and engage in a high level of litigation. Ziedonis finds that the rate of 
litigation per R&D dollar is quite high in the semiconductor industry, both 
among large manufacturing firms and recently entered design firms.74 
Moreover, the rate of litigation per real R&D dollar nearly doubled following 
the creation of the CAFC. Bessen and Meurer find that the semiconductor 
industry has the second highest rate of litigation per firm (after the chemical 
industry―including pharmaceuticals).75 Clearly, this high rate of litigation in 
semiconductors is offset by an even higher relative rate of patenting compared 
to other industries. But the simple fact is that the litigation hazard faced by 
firms is quite high. Second, although defensive patenting may lessen a firm’s 
71 Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 486–87 
(1995). 
72 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 47 (“a larger portfolio of patents reduces 
the probability of filing a suit on any individual patent in the portfolio” controlling for 
observable characteristics of the patent and patent owner); Allison et al., supra note 41, at 
468–69; see Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing 
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at 
8. 
73 Allison et al., supra note 41, at 474 (citing Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham 
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisted: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001)). 
74 Ziedonis, supra note 47, at 817–18. In Bronwyn Hall’s latest study of patents and 
firm share value she concludes, “[a] preliminary interpretation of these results is the 
following: in established firms, accumulating patents for defensive reasons has little impact 
on market value because the past history of R&D spending is already a good indicator of the 
firm’s technology position. On the other hand, an above average accumulation could be 
slightly negative for value if it indicates the [presence] of threatened suits for infringement.” 
HALL, supra note 36, sec. 4. 
75 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 12. 
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litigation risk, all else equal, when all firms in an industry build defensive 
portfolios the net result appears to be greater litigation hazard. Bessen and 
Meurer find that two randomly selected firms within a 4-digit SIC industry are 
much more likely to engage in litigation with each other if they both have large 
portfolios than if they both have small portfolios. Thus, although it is 
individually rational for each firm to reduce its litigation risk by building a 
defensive portfolio, the collective equilibrium effect is to increase industry 
litigation hazards. This suggests that “defensive” patents are not used purely 
defensively. 
Anti-competitive and opportunistic patent suits are kin to the “normal” 
suits that seek exclusion or licensing; they differ because they are based on 
“weak” patents—a difference not directly observable to the econometrician. 
Anti-competitive suits rely on weak patents to exclude competitors.76 
Opportunistic suits rely on weak patents to induce licensing. A patent suit is 
weak if the objective probability of successfully proving infringement and 
overcoming defenses, such as patent invalidity, is low at the time of filing. 
A rational defendant will sometimes yield to the threat of a weak suit for 
three main reasons.77 First, court errors are difficult to avoid in patent litigation, 
because claim interpretation is complex and it is difficult for fact-finders to 
assess evidence of infringement. Thus, a deserving defendant may face a 
significant risk of liability.78 Second, a weak lawsuit may be difficult to 
distinguish from a strong lawsuit, at least until a defendant gathers information 
about the patent through discovery. Finally, even a weak lawsuit may impose 
significant costs on the defendant, and the defendant might settle to avoid the 
nuisance of mounting a defense.79 
Evidence suggestive of anti-competitive patent litigation comes from a 
study by Josh Lerner and another by Lerner and Jean O. Lanjouw. Lerner 
studies the research programs of bio-tech firms and he finds that small firms 
avoid R&D in fields where the threat of litigation from larger firms is high.80 
He notes that the rate of litigation per bio-tech patent is very high and that firms 
76 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) 
(illustrating an anti-competitive patent suit: Food Machinery obtained a patent by 
fraudulently concealing a prior use from the PTO; the company was found liable for an 
antitrust violation because it attempted to enforce the invalid patent against a competitor); 
see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. 743 F.2d 1282, 1288–92 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that patentee knew patent was invalid because there was a previous inventor and 
because of public use before the patent application). 
77 This discussion of opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits is drawn from Michael 
J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 
44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512–513 (2003). 
78 Allison et al., supra note 41, at 475 (observing that the high frequency of lawsuits 
per patent among software and computer-related patents is perhaps explained by the 
uncertainty of software patent law). 
79 See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought 
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A 
New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
2 (1996). 
80 Lerner, supra note 71, at 486–87. 
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spend as much on legal fees as they do on R&D. The study does not indicate, 
however, that the patents held by the larger firms are low quality. Thus, it is 
quite possible that smaller firms are simply looking for less crowded market 
niches in which they can compete more profitably. 
Lanjouw and Lerner show that preliminary injunctions in patent cases tend 
to be used by large firms hoping to impose financial distress on smaller rivals.81 
The authors conjecture that preliminary injunctions may be especially harmful 
in innovative industries “driven by smaller, more vulnerable, venture-capital-
based firms.”82 Despite the restrictive standard that generally applies to 
preliminary injunctions,83 they are relatively common in patent cases.84 They 
are useful predatory devices, because small firms face a “particular difficulty of 
raising external funds to finance litigation.”85 
Despite widespread popular accounts of opportunistic patent suits, hard 
evidence is scarce. Two pieces of data provide some hints about the nature of 
the problem and whether a problem exists. First, as we mentioned earlier, 
independent inventors and small businesses have a very high rate of patent 
litigation on a lawsuit per patent basis.86 Popular accounts of opportunistic 
litigation suggest that “patent trolls” are usually small firms or independent 
inventors. Possibly, opportunistic litigation contributes to the high litigation 
rate of small firms and independent inventors.87 It is also possible the high rate 
is explained by the importance of patents to these entities. 
Second, we searched for all instances of attorney fee-shifting in U.S. 
patent cases in the last ten years and found that fees were shifted to the alleged 
81 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory Use of 
Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575–76 (2001). 
82 Id. at 575. 
83 See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §2948, 129 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is frequently observed that a 
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary . . . remedy.”). 
84 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 81, at 595 (noting that preliminary injunctions are 
common in patent cases). The Federal Circuit relaxed the standards for preliminary 
injunctions in patent cases. Regional circuit courts used to require a showing of validity and 
infringement “beyond question.” The Federal Circuit adopted a requirement of likelihood of 
validity and infringement for a preliminary injunction. See John G. Mills, The Developing 
Standard for Irreparable Harm in Preliminary Injunctions to Prevent Patent Infringement, 
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 55–56 (1999). 
85 Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 81, at 574. 
86 Barnaby J. Feder, Medtronic Must Pay Inventor $159 Million, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2004, at C6 (noting that Dr. Gary Michelson holds 250 patents and 400 more applications; 
he frequently litigates to enforce his patents and is currently embroiled in a suit with 
Medtronic over their performance under licenses relating to patents on spinal surgical 
devices). 
87 Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 63, 88–89 (2004) (“Because many submarine patentees are individuals who do 
not file abroad, they will not be deterred by the eighteen-month publication rule. Further, our 
data show that individual domestic inventors, who are least likely to patent abroad, are the 
most common users of the continuation system. There are 854 patents that took twenty years 
or longer in prosecution, and 26% of these patents issued to U.S. individuals.”). 
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infringer in 25 cases.88 This averages 1% of patent suits that terminated via pre-
trial motion or trial.89 The reasons given for shifting fees to an alleged infringer 
are almost always vexatious litigation, failure to investigate whether 
infringement was present, abusive discovery practice, or inequitable conduct. 
Thus, these opinions suggest that these cases represent instances of 
opportunistic (or anti-competitive) conduct by the patentee. The 1% figure 
understates the frequency of abusive litigation for three reasons. First, it is 
difficult for alleged infringers to prove the patentee was acting 
opportunistically. Second, it may be difficult for alleged infringers to recognize 
that they are subject to abusive litigation. Third, presumably, opportunistic 
patent litigation often succeeds and alleged infringers settle. 
C. How Do Patent Policy Instruments Influence the Patent Premium? 
Little empirical work links patent policy instruments to the behavior of 
patent applicants, patent litigants, and patent courts. Future work should 
strengthen these links and extend them to connect patent reforms to the patent 
premium. At the top of our wish list, we would like to see research that links 
changes in the non-obviousness doctrine with the behavior of patent applicants, 
patent litigants, and ultimately with the magnitude and incidence of the patent 
premium. We would like to see similar research tracking changes in claim 
interpretation and application of the doctrine of equivalents.90 
Empirical researchers have started to look at the impact of policy change 
on patent applications, interference proceedings, and trial outcomes. Hall finds 
a significant structural break in the time series of U.S. patent applications by 
American applicants between 1983 and 1984 (except for computer industry, 
which has a break between 1992 and 1993).91 Based on interviews with 
industry members, she suggests that the increase in patenting resulted from 
successful, high-profile patent suits that convinced businesses that the Federal 
Circuit was making patents more valuable.92 
There is also direct evidence that the Federal Circuit has changed patent 
validity and patent scope. The research must be used cautiously though, 
because it does not control for the selection effect. Allison and Lemley find the 
88 We counted awards to defendants in infringement actions plus awards to plaintiffs in 
declaratory judgment actions during the fiscal years 1994 through 2004. 
89 This number is calculated for the five years running from fiscal year 1994 through 
fiscal year 1999. During this period fees were shifted to alleged infringers 11 times. The data 
on patent case terminations is obtained from the Federal Judicial Center. The data shows the 
method of disposition was pre-trial motion in 651 cases and trial in 389 cases, thus the 1% 
figure is obtained by dividing 11 by (389 + 651). 
90 Glynn Lunney applied stock market event study methodology to Festo and other 
leading patent cases and could not find evidence that the market reacts to shifts in patent 
doctrine. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A 
Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004). 
91 HALL, supra note 36, sec. 2.2. 
92 Id. Kortum and Lerner disagree that the recent increase in patent applications can be 
explained by the creation of the Federal Circuit. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, What is 
Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? 28 RES. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1999). 
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patent validity rate has increased since the creation of the Federal Circuit.93 
Lunney finds that the Federal Circuit is less likely to find infringement than 
predecessor courts and thus has narrowed patent scope.94 Wagner and 
Petherbridge find Federal Circuit claim interpretation decisions are growing 
more predictable.95 
Another important strand of empirical work examines whether patent 
doctrine has a differential impact on small firms and independent inventors. In 
separate studies, Mossinghoff and Lemley and Chien investigated the patent 
priority system to see what impact it has on small inventors.96 The first-to-
invent system has survived in the U.S. despite pressure to harmonize with the 
rest of the world by switching to a first-to-file priority system. These 
researchers find small inventors get little, if any, benefit from the American 
system. In contrast, Lemley and Moore find that independent inventors 
especially benefit from continuation practice, and that continuation practice 
continues to be popular despite a variety of recent patent reforms that some 
thought would cause the number of continuation applications to decline.97 
93 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 194 (“[Study of] 299 patents litigated in 239 
different cases. These cases represent all written, final validity decisions by either district 
courts or the Federal Circuit reported in the U.S.P.Q. during an almost eight-year period 
from early 1989 through 1996.”); id. at 206 (noting the validity rate has increased since the 
creation of the Federal Circuit); id. at 205 (noting that 54% of patents are found valid);  see 
also Lunney, supra note 90. 
94 Lunney, supra, note 90, at 11–12 (finding patent owners succeed about 30% of the 
time at the Federal Circuit and suggesting the availability of injunctive relief explains the 
departure from a 50% success rate); id. at 14 (finding that the Federal Circuit is less likely 
than predecessor courts to invalidate a patent, but also less likely to find infringement, and 
thus, no more likely to find in favor of a patent owner); id. at 15 (“In the pre-Federal Circuit 
era, a ruling that the patent claim(s) at issue was invalid due to obviousness accounted for 
64.8% of the failure results. In contrast, under the Federal Circuit, a failure to satisfy the 
nonobviousness requirement accounted for only 14.6% of the failure results.”); see also 
Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ 
Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 130 (2001) (noting that one-fifth of federal civil, 
non-personal injury tort, and contract cases are appealed, and one-fifth of the appeals led to a 
reversal). 
95 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1156 (2004). 
96 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage 
to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 426 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & 
Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary? 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
1299, 1300 (2003). 
97 Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 65 (“Congress and the courts have created a 
number of patent doctrines designed to combat the misuse of continuation applications. In 
the last ten years, they have changed the term of patents, ended the secrecy of most patent 
applications, revived the controversial doctrine of written description, and created an entirely 
new defense of prosecution laches. While these changes have indeed mitigated some of the 
worst abuses of the continuation process, our data demonstrate that they are not likely to be 
effective in tackling the core of the problem.”); id. at 69 (“The results of our comprehensive 
study of patent continuations shows that 23% of all patents granted from 1976 through 2000 
claim priority to one or more previously filed applications.”); id. (“Although there has been 
some fluctuation over the years in the number of continuation patents filed, the trend has 
been a steady increase. In the mid-1970s, about one-fifth of all issued patents were based on 
20 LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1 
 
 
IV. PATENT PROSECUTION 
A. The Endogenous Nature of Patent Scope and Validity 
Research shows that litigated patents differ significantly from non-litigated 
patents. For example, litigated patents have more claims, more citations to prior 
art, and are more likely to be part of a family of patents claiming priority from 
a common predecessor.98 Research also documents the growing complexity of 
patents. The number of claims, number of prior art citations, and prosecution 
time have all grown rapidly.99 These results raise the question of how much 
control patent prosecutors have over the scope and validity of patents. Perhaps 
litigated patents differ from non-litigated patents because patent applicants 
recognize which patents are most likely to be litigated and therefore invest 
more effort in prosecuting those patents.100 Perhaps patents have grown more 
complex because most applicants face an elevated probability of litigation or a 
higher expected return from their patents and this drives increased investment 
in prosecution of all of their patent applications.101 
Patent applicants can refine their patents in a variety of ways. First, they 
can conduct better prior art searches, and then draft better claims to avoid 
troublesome prior art. Incidentally, the duty to disclose material prior art may 
lead to more citations to prior art for firms who search the prior art more 
continuations. By the mid-1990s the number of patents issued based on continuation 
applications climbed to 31%. That number has declined somewhat in the last several years, 
in part because of changes in the way patent term is calculated, but continuation patents still 
constitute about one-quarter of all issued patents.”). 
98 See Allison et al., supra note 41, at 456–457 (“Patent applicants whose patents were 
ultimately litigated filed many more continuation applications than ordinary applicants.”); id. 
at 457 (“Litigated patents also tended to be part of ‘families’ of issued patents.”); id. at 459 
(“Litigated patents also spent significantly longer in prosecution than issued patents [using 
grant year–filing year].”); id. (“For this reason, time in prosecution was not a significant 
predictor of litigation in the multivariate regression in the sample study once we controlled 
for [the number of patent applications filed].”). 
99 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
100 Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 65 (“[C]ontinuation practice can be―and has 
been―used strategically to gain advantages over competitors by waiting to see what product 
the competitor will make, and then drafting patent claims specifically designed to cover that 
product. Finally, some patentees have used continuation practice to delay the issuance of 
their patent precisely in order to surprise a mature industry, a process known as ‘submarine 
patenting.’”). 
101 Allison & Lemley, supra note 99, at 139–141; id. at 81 (“W]e speculate on 
explanations for the dramatic increase in the complexity of patents. We reject a number of 
possible explanations, including both changes in the quality of PTO examination and 
changes in the nature of technology, as inconsistent with the data. The hypothesis that best 
fits the data is that patents are increasingly valuable to businesses, and that companies that 
expect to use patents in licensing or litigation are willing to spend more time and effort in the 
PTO to get a better patent.”); Allison et al., supra note 41, at 455 (noting that patent 
applicants file more claims and cite more prior art to increase the value of their patents in 
litigation). 
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diligently.102 Second, they can refine the claim language. Better drafted claims 
may have greater scope, and they may better anticipate technological 
developments or invent-around possibilities. Also, carefully nested claims may 
be more resistant to invalidation, providing better odds that the relevant claim 
will survive invalidation of more general claims.103 Third, they can put more 
effort into enabling research and drafting the written description. Finally, patent 
applicants can delay prosecution and observe activities of potential infringers 
and complementary developments in technology. This enables them to write 
claim language that literally “reads on” infringers’ technology, including later-
developed technology. 
Possibly, prosecutors are best described as passive rather than strategic, 
i.e., their actions are dictated by the nature of the invention, the requirements of 
patent law, and the whims of the examiner.104 The high level of refinement of 
litigated patents could be explained by technology—valuable inventions are 
more likely to be litigated, and they feature complex technology that requires 
extensive patent refinement. The trend toward increasingly complex patents 
could also be explained by increasingly complex technology or rigorous patent 
examination. For example, continuations are filed most often in the 
biotechnology and chemical fields.105 Perhaps this occurs because patents in 
these fields tend to be complicated, or perhaps this occurs because these 
industries value patents more highly than other industries. 
We conducted some exploratory regressions that suggest that the number 
of claims and the number of citations to patent prior art are both determined in 
part by characteristics of the applicant.106 We find that citations and claims are 
positively correlated with the applicants’ cash flow and capital intensity. We 
find that large firms, foreign firms, and firms with large patent portfolios refine 
less after controlling for other factors. These preliminary findings suggest that 
102 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 231 (noting that amount of prior art cited is not 
correlated with validity); id. at 234 (noting that uncited prior art is more helpful than cited 
prior art in invalidating a patent); id. at 227–28 (observing that courts rarely disaggregate 
claims and there might not be much value at trial to owning a patent with elaborately nested 
claims); id. at 230–31 (noting that one is unable to establish significant relationship between 
number of backward citations and finding of validity); id. at 239 (finding no significant 
relationship between validity and time in prosecution or time between issuance and the final 
determination of validity); id. at 232–34 (citing evidence that non-cited prior art is more 
likely to be used to invalidate a patent on novelty or obviousness grounds).  This evidence 
does not make a very strong case that including more backward cites causes the patent to be 
stronger.  Instead, it suggests that when a bad prior art search leads to sloppy claim drafting 
patentees get surprised at trial.  Further, some patentees perhaps hope the prior art the PTO 
did not find will not be found by the defendant. 
103 It is not clear that a more refined patent should have more claims. 
104 Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
151, 155 (2004) (presenting empirical evidence that examiners vary widely in terms of the 
changes in claim language in patents they examine). 
105 Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 85–86. 
106 The data set is described in Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44. The regression results 
are available from the authors. 
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market factors, as well as legal and technical factors, determine effort to refine 
patents.107 
B. Reforms to Improve Patent Office Performance 
Popular and academic commentators have proposed a variety of Patent 
Office reforms in the wake of complaints about the low quality of patent 
examination. Mark Lemley observed that agency resources for patent 
examination are limited, the average patent gets only 18 hours of review, and 
thus, examination offers little more than a quick look at most patents.108 Severe 
limits on Patent Office resources, combined with recognition that most patents 
turn out to have no economic value, push commentators to recommend that the 
Patent Office prioritize patent applications and spend more effort reviewing 
patents that are most likely to be valuable.109 
Empirical research suggests that information useful for prioritization may 
come from three sources: characteristics of litigated patents; characteristics of 
patents that are renewed; and other empirical research on sources of the patent 
premium. Research on litigation and renewal offers a fairly consistent view 
about the characteristics of important patents. Patent renewal and litigation are 
both positively correlated with the number of claims, the amount of prior art 
cited, the number of patent applications that share a common ancestor, and the 
number of citations subsequently received.110 Stock market, survey, litigation 
and renewal research all suggest that patents are especially important in certain 
industries. 
107 Further evidence comes from studies that show litigation is more likely to occur 
when patents are young, and patented technology is old. Allison et al., supra note 41, at 445; 
id. at 462 n.114 (“Prior studies of patent litigation show that it takes over twelve years on 
average from the time a patent application is filed to the time litigation is completed.”); 
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 237 (“[I]t appears that most patents litigated to judgment 
involve fairly old technology.”). These findings are consistent with the view that certain 
patents are cultivated in the Patent Office by applicants who are preparing for patent 
litigation. 
108 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1500 (2001). 
109 Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 597 (1999); Allison et al., supra note 41, at 463 (arguing that if 
the patent value theory is correct, the PTO is devoting its resources in the right manner by 
disproportionately spending its time examining the most valuable patents). 
110 Allison et. al., supra note 41, at 449; id. at 451 (noting that litigated patents include 
significantly more claims than issued patents); id. at 453 (noting that litigated patents also 
cite significantly more prior art than issued patents, and that patents that end up being 
litigated are much more likely to be cited as prior art by other issued U.S. patents than are 
non-litigated patents); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 45 (2004); Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on 
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 140 (2001); MOORE, supra note 6, at 15, tbl. 1 (2004) 
(noting expired patents had fewer claims, cited fewer U.S. patents, received fewer cites 
(most dramatic 7.13 vs. 4.73), listed fewer inventors (2.14 vs. 1.96), and had fewer related 
applications). 
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Examination reform might follow the example set by the “second pair of 
eyes” policy recently implemented by the PTO to improve the quality of 
business method patents. The PTO devotes extra examination effort to patent 
applications assigned to Class 705, a class with many business method patents 
relating to data processing. For example, the PTO might devote extra 
examination effort to patent applications that contain a large number of claims, 
a large number of citations, or come from a large family of co-pending 
applications. Of course, examination priorities cannot be based on number of 
citations received. Instead, it might be possible to enact a “mid-life” review of 
highly cited patents, for example, by giving the competition authorities (FTC, 
Antitrust Division of DOJ) or the PTO the authority and resources to review 
and modify patents that are too broad or too narrow. Finally, reform might 
target patents in certain industries or technologies for more intense scrutiny, as 
exemplified by the “second pair of eyes” policy. 
Although prioritizing examination seems attractive, the proposals listed 
above face two serious problems. The first and simplest is evasion. Allison and 
Hunter find patent applicants have had significant success evading the “second 
pair of eyes” review by writing patent applications in a way that avoids Class 
705.111 Similarly, applicants may alter their prosecution strategies to avoid the 
other reforms mentioned above. For example, review triggered by the number 
of claims might induce applicants to file for more patents containing fewer 
claims. 
Second, the statistics mentioned above all correlate with private patent 
value, but maximizing social value is the appropriate goal for patent reform. 
Thus, we must consider whether private patent value is likely to correlate with 
social value. Citations received indicate social value, assuming that the pioneer 
status of an invention explains why its patent is highly cited.112 It is also 
possible that a patent receives a lot of citations simply because it is in a 
crowded art. Subsequent patents might cite earlier patents simply to distinguish 
them, and not because they build on them.113 The link between number of 
111 See John Allison & Starling Hunter, A Non-Solution to a Non-Problem (2004) 
(working paper on file with authors, available at http://www.utexas/edu.depts/bbr/rnews/ 
2004/allison/htm). 
112 We examined a list of 33 patents awarded after 1962 and listed in the National 
Inventors Hall of Fame. We compared their characteristics (number of citations made and 
received and number of claims) to the mean values of those characteristics for the grant year. 
We found that the famous patents receive significantly more citations, but they do not have 
significantly more claims and they make significantly fewer citations. The magnitude of the 
difference in citations received is not that large and was driven by a few patents like the PCR 
patent that got the lion’s share of citations. Our result is consistent with Dietmar Harhoff et 
al., Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 
515 (1999) (looking at a sample of “successful” German patents and finding they receive 
more citations, but not that much more); see also Allison et al., supra note 41, at 440 (“[O]ne 
reason that citations received . . . may correlate so highly with litigation is that such patents 
were early entrants in a field now crowded with competitors.”). 
113 IAIN M. COCKBURN ET AL., ARE ALL PATENT EXAMINERS EQUAL? THE IMPACT OF 
CHARACTERISTICS ON PATENT STATISTICS AND LITIGATION OUTCOMES 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8980, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8980 (“[A] 
24 LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1 
 
 
claims, number of prior art citations, and social value is also debatable.114 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of this approach is that litigation 
involves social costs that might be reduced if the patents most likely to be 
litigated are improved by more thorough examination. 
V. THE SOCIAL COST OF PATENT LITIGATION 
Parts III and IV discussed lessons from empirical research on patent 
litigation for patent law and regulation. Part V shifts attention to the social 
burden created by patent litigation. We put core patent policy goals aside and 
look instead at traditional questions from the economics of civil procedure, 
such as, how can we encourage settlement and minimize the expected social 
cost from patent litigation? 
We start by examining trends in patent litigation. The rate of filing has 
doubled in the last 10 years.115 Furthermore, Bessen and Meurer find that the 
annual patent litigation hazard for a publicly traded firm has grown from about 
25% in 1987 to about 46% in 1999.116 Assuming the average cost associated 
with a filing is constant over time, this trend indicates an increasing burden 
from litigation. If the average cost is also growing then the burden is even 
larger.117 Stepping back, the social harm from this increased burden might be 
less troubling when we take into account the increased rate of patenting. In fact, 
Lanjouw and Schankerman argue that when we account for the increased 
propensity to patent in more litigious fields, the propensity to litigate on a per 
significant portion of the overall variance among patents in measures such as the number and 
pattern of citations received, the number and pattern of citations made, and the approval time 
can be explained by the identity of the examiner.”); id. at 3 (“[T]here is a significant positive 
relationship between the citations received by a subsequently litigated patent and the 
‘propensity’ of its examiner to issue patents that attract a large number[] of citations.”); id. 
(“Although the outcome of a test of validity by the CAFC is unrelated to the number of 
citations received by that particular patent, validity is strongly related to the portion of the 
citation rate explained by the examiner’s idiosyncratic propensity to issue patents which 
receive a high level of citations. To the extent that the examiner-specific citation rate reflects 
the ‘generosity’ of examiners in allowing claims, our empirical findings suggest that one of 
the roles of the CAFC is to review the discretion exercised in the patent examination 
process.”). 
114 We discovered that the famous patents have significantly fewer prior art citations. 
For a similar finding, see Allison et al., supra note 41, at 452. (“[T]he number of claims 
bears no necessary relation to the breadth of a patent. Indeed, if anything the relationship 
should be inverse―the closer the patent is to the prior art, and therefore the narrower it is, 
the more claims a patentee may draft in order to help preserve the patent’s validity.”). 
115 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that the number of patent 
suits in the last two decades rose almost tenfold). 
116 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 18. 
117 We do not have a good measure of patent litigation costs. Ideally, we would like to 
know the sum of payments to law firms, the opportunity costs associated with the effort 
devoted to litigation by managers and in-house attorneys, and costs from delay and 
uncertainty created by litigation. 
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patent basis is essentially constant.118 But patent enforcement costs are only 
part of the story. It is possible that increasing litigation imposes an increasing 
burden on innovators who cannot avoid the growing maze of patents and 
ambitions of patent owners. Bessen and Meurer find that the ratio of the hazard 
of being an alleged infringer to real R&D expenditures rose 61% from 1987 to 
1999 among public companies.119 Regardless of whether the social burden from 
patent litigation is growing, commentators agree that it is large compared to 
other types of civil litigation.120 
The Federal Circuit has been active in reforming patent trial procedures, 
but there is not much evidence that it has improved the efficiency of patent 
trials. The court has been criticized for creating uncertainty about claim 
interpretation121 and for failing to create national uniformity in patent trials. 
Kimberly Moore shows that forum shopping continues to be a significant 
problem in patent litigation.122 The advantages of choosing the best forum put 
pressure on the parties to file a lawsuit; the patent holder might fear an alleged 
infringer will gain a forum selection123 advantage by filing a declaratory 
118  Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that increase is mostly 
explained by the increase in the number of patents issued, and a shift of patents to 
technology fields that are more litigious). 
119 Ziedonis finds that litigation per dollar spent on R&D has increased in the 
semiconductor industry.  Ziedonis, supra note 47, at 816. 
120 Studies of patent litigation estimate that plaintiffs plus defendants lose 2–3% of their 
market value upon announcement of patent lawsuit filing. See Lerner, supra note 71; Sanjai 
Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from 
Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 223 (1994). 
121 Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (“Of the 179 cases that involved an 
express review of claim construction, the Federal Circuit modified claim interpretations in 
78 cases, or 44% of the total, during the twenty-eight months covered by this study. Further, 
53 out of these 78 cases (68%) were reversed on the basis of claim construction. In sum, the 
Federal Circuit reversed 29.6% of cases involving an express review of claim 
construction.”); Moore, Patent Cases, supra note 4, at 2–3 (“In the absence of a route for 
expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced to proceed with lengthy and 
expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim construction.”); see 
Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence 
Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 126 (1999) (finding 
uncertainty lowest in IP suits). 
122 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001) (“The empirical results presented in this 
Article demonstrate that despite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of forum 
continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation.”). 
123 See id. at 920 (“In cases in which the defendant was able to choose the forum (as 
with declaratory judgment actions) rather than the patent holder (as in infringement suits), 
there was a significant difference in outcome: the defendant is much more likely to win 
when it selects the forum.”); Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368 (“Juries are 
significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringement (68% patentee win rate). But when a 
possible infringer initiates a declaratory judgment action, the patentee only has a 38% win 
rate. If the same were true of judges, then one could attribute the difference in win rate to the 
strength of the cases―namely, that alleged infringers only bring declaratory judgment suits 
when they have strong cases. But patentee win rates are substantially uniform in bench trials, 
regardless of who initiated the suit.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 
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judgment suit.124 Besides pushing the patent holder to file earlier than it would 
have otherwise, the threat of a declaratory judgment suit may chill settlement 
negotiations in advance of filing suit.125 
 The Federal Circuit’s treatment of the role of the jury in patent trials has 
achieved mixed results. On one hand, the power of the jury has been reduced 
by the decision to make claim construction a question of law.126 But on the 
other hand, the frequency of jury trials has soared.127 This is problematic 
because jury trials are more expensive and take longer than bench trials.128 And 
patent juries display a pronounced bias in favor of inventors129 and against 
foreigners.130 The Seventh Amendment jury trial right prevents the United 
States from mimicking the rest of the world and abolishing jury trials in patent 
cases. Therefore, further progress mitigating problems with jury trials will be 
difficult. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Empirical research reveals the patent system has widely varying effects 
across different industries. It provides critical incentives for research and 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 859–60 (2002)  [hereinafter Moore, Jury Demands] (“Figure 4 
shows that the patent holder’s jury demand rate rose to 76% after isolating those cases in 
which the patent holder initiated suit. By contrast, when the patent holder is the defendant 
(i.e., when the accused infringer initiates the lawsuit by filing a declaratory judgment action), 
the patent holder demanded a jury in 53% of the cases.”). 
124 See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 381 (noting that 14% of patent trials are 
declaratory judgments). 
125 The reasonable apprehension of suit is a precondition to a declaratory judgment.  
See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
126 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
127 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 211 (noting that in 1978 only 8.3% of patent 
trials were tried to a jury, but by 1994, jury trials accounted for 70% of all patent trials); id. 
at 213 (noting that juries more likely to hold a patent valid than judges); Moore, Black Box, 
supra note 7, at 366 (finding that jury trials in patent cases have risen from 2.6% in 1970 to 
62% in 1999). 
128 See Moore, Jury Demands, supra note 123, at 857. 
129 See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368 (“For example, juries are significantly 
more likely to find patents valid, infringed, and willfully infringed than judges.”); id. at 386 
(“When the jury is the adjudicator, the patent holder prevails in 63% of all claims and 68% 
of all suits. When the judge is the adjudicator, the patent holder succeeds in 49% of all 
claims and 51% of all suits.”). 
130 Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 
1504 (2003) (“Domestic parties win 64% of cases tried to juries in which the adversary is 
foreign; foreign parties win the remaining 36% of such cases. However, there is no 
significant difference in win rates for foreign and domestic parties when judges 
adjudicate.”); see id. at 1504–05 (“Although foreign inventors acquire 45% of patent rights 
annually, they seek to enforce their patent rights in only 13% of the litigated cases.”); 
MOORE, supra note 6, at 14–15, tbl.1, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=566941 (showing no difference in 
foreign inventor vs. American inventor maintenance); id. at 19–20, tbl.2 (noting that U.S. 
corporations are slightly more likely to renew than foreign corporations, but that foreign 
corporations are more likely to maintain than U.S. corporations). 
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development in the pharmaceutical and a few other industries. In most 
industries, it provides a relatively small incentive. Ideally, patent policy should 
be tailored to reflect these industry differences.131 Patent law should be mindful 
of the various sources of patent-based profit. Certain strategic uses of patents 
are socially harmful; more empirical research is needed to quantify the social 
loss from anti-competitive and opportunistic patent litigation, and guide 
policies that will discourage anti-social litigation. Finally, more research is 
needed to identify when patent disputes will degenerate into lawsuits. This 
research is needed to guide reforms designed to contain the apparently high and 
growing social cost from patent litigation. 
 
 131  For a thoughtful discussion of industry-specific patent policy, see Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
